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I. INTRODUCTION
The Internal Revenue Code of 1954 (Code) imposes a federal
estate tax to be paid by the executor of a decedent's estate' on both
conveyances of property at death2 and on gifts made during the
three years prior to death.3 This estate tax is imposed on the net
value of the estate. To arrive at the net value or "taxable" estate,
the executor first determines the gross estate value by adding the
fair market value of all assets owned by decedent at death' and all
assets gratuitously transferred by him during the three years prior
to death.' This gross estate value is then reduced by any applicable
deductions' to arrive at the taxable estate. This Recent Develop-
1. I.R.C. § 2002.
2. I.R.C. § 2001.
3. I.R.C. § 2035.
4. I.R.C. §§ 2031, 2033.
5. I.R.C. § 2035. Two exceptions do exist. The executor may elect to value the estate
by reporting the value of the assets as of the date six months after the date of the decedent's
death, or in the case of property disposed of before such time, the value as of the date of
disposition. I.R.C. § 2032. Additionally, the executor may elect to value certain farm and
closely held business real property in accordance with their value for farming or closely held
business purposes rather than at fair market value. I.R.C. § 2032A.
6. I.R.C. H§ 2053-2057. Allowable deductions include amounts for certain expenses,
indebtedness, taxes, and losses, and bequests to charity, to the surviving spouse, and to any
surviving orphaned minor children. Id.
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ment will examine the relationship between two Code provisions
that are essential to the calculation of the taxable estate. Section
2031 establishes the value of the "gross estate," and section 2053
provides that certain administrative expenses are deductible from
the gross estate.
Recently, in Estate of Joslyn v. Commissioner7 and Estate of
Jenner v. Commissioner,' two United States Courts of Appeals ap-
plied sections 2031 and 2053 in a manner that substantially benefits
estates that possess large holdings of a particular stock. Because
large blocks of stock are difficult to liquidate, the per-share price of
the stock will actually be lower than the stock exchange price.'
Under section 2031, the executor may account for this factor in
calculating the fair market value of the stock. 0 Accordingly, in both
recent cases, the executors reduced the value of the section 2031
gross estate by the amount of underwriters' commissions necessary
to liquidate the stock. The executors then deducted the same com-
missions from the gross estate as administrative expenses under
section 2053. In both cases, the courts allowed the deductions. The
estates thus benefited from a double deduction. This Recent Devel-
opment will examine the interrelationship between sections 2031
and 2053 and proposes that Congress eliminate this "double deduc-
tion" by amending section 2053.
II. SECTION 2031: THE VALUATION OF THE STOCK
The enactment of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 included
the general valuation provisions of the Internal Revenue Code of
1939" without substantial revision.12 The broad, general language of
section 2031 appears to require the taxation of every existing asset
in a decedent's estate, regardless of ownership. This is limited else-
where in the Code to the value of the decedent's interest in prop-
erty.13 Furthermore, except for the valuation of unlisted stocks and
7. 566 F.2d 677 (9th Cir. 1977).
8. 577 F.2d 1100 (7th Cir. 1978).
9. See notes 18-21 infra and accompanying text.
10. See notes 23-27 infra and accompanying text.
11. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 3, § 811, 53 Stat. 120 (now I.R.C. §§ 2031-2045).
12. Pub. L. No. 83-591, §§ 2031, 2033, 68A Stat. 380, 381 (1954). In 1962, Congress
deleted the exemption for foreign real property resulting in the present formulation of the
language of the Code. Pub. L. No. 87-834, § 18(a)(1), 76 Stat. 1052 (1962). I.R.C. § 2031(a)
provides:
(a) General.-The value of the gross estate of the decedent shall be determined
by including to the extent provided for in this part, the value at the time of his death of
all property, real or personal, tangible or intangible, wherever situated.
13. I.R.C. § 2033 provides that "[t]he value of the gross estate shall include the value
of all property to the extent of the interest therein of the decedent at the time of his death."
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securities," the section provides no guidance as to the definition or
calculation of value. Instead, the Code leaves the valuation of differ-
ent types of property to the regulations. As a general rule, an asset's
value is its fair market value at the time of the decedent's death. 5
The regulations define fair market value as the price at which a
willing buyer would buy and a willing seller would sell if both were
under no compulsion and had reasonable knowledge of relevant
facts." In addition, the regulations provide specific valuation rules
for certain types of property," including stocks and bonds. If no
precise fair market value can be given to stock as of the date of
death," the regulations provide a formula by which the executor
may determine the value. The formula sets the stock's value at the
mean between the high and the low selling prices on the date of
death or an interpolated mean based on trading on the days closest
to the date of death of the decedent. 9
This method of valuing stock is adequate for stock holdings of
the average estate. When the estate possesses large holdings of a
particular stock, however, this formulaic approach may not present
the stock's true value. The sale of large blocks of stock on the valua-
tion date would tend to force prices down because of the volume.
Supporters of this "blockage" theory20 contend that since such a
14. I.R.C. § 2031(b).
15. Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-1(b), T.D. 6826, 1965-2 C.B. 368 provides in part:
(b) Valuation of property in general. The value of every item of property includible
in a decedent's gross estate under sections 2031 through 2044 is its fair market value at
the time of the decedent's death, except that if the executor elects-the alternate valua-
tion method under section 2032, it is the fair market value thereof at the date, and with
the adjustments, prescribed in that section. The fair market value is the price at which
the property would change hands between a willing buyer and a willing seller, neither
being under any compulsion to buy or to sell and both having reasonable knowledge of
relevant facts. The fair market value of a particular item of property includible in the
decedent's gross estate is not to be determined by a forced sale price. Nor is the fair
market value of an item of property to be determined by the sale price of the item in a
market other than that in which such item is most commonly sold to the public, taking
into account the location of the item wherever appropriate. Thus, in the case of an item
of property includible in the decedent's gross estate, which is generally obtained by the
public in the retail market, the fair market value of such an item of property is the price
at which the item or a comparable item would be sold at retail.
16. Id.
17. See Treas. Reg. §§ 20.2031-1 to .2031-10 (1958) (portions subsequently amended).
18. Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-2(a) (1958).
19. Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-2(b), T.D. 7327, 1974-2 C.B. 294.
20. The courts looked askance at the blockage theory when it was argued initially. In
the early case of Bingham's Adm'r v. Commonwealth, 196 Ky. 318, 244 S.W. 781 (1922), the
administrator of an estate attempted to assert the blockage theory in a state inheritance tax
proceeding. At the time of her death, the decedent owned very large blocks of stock in the
Standard Oil group of corporations and in several others. Id. at 333, 244 S.W. at 788. The
administrator argued that the "bid" prices from the stock exchanges did not accurately
reflect the "fair cash value" of the decedent's holdings. He suggested that such prices were
1979]1 1005
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
accurate for small holdings of from ten to 100 shares but that the difficulty in disposing of a
large block of stock necessarily lowered its value per share by as much as twenty percent. Id.
at 333, 244 S.W. at 788, 789-90. The Kentucky Court of Appeals rejected this argument,
reasoning that to appraise the same property on the same date at different values per unit
merely because of the size of the holding was unjust. In the court's view, such a theory utterly
disregarded the constitutional guarantees that all men are " 'free and equal' and that taxes
'shall be uniform upon all property of the same class.' "Id. at 336, 244 S.W. at 789. The court
viewed the blockage theory as an attempt to devise "one method applicable to the rich and
another to the poor for valuing the same kind of property on the same day." Id. at 338, 244
S.W. at 790.
Similarly, many federal courts refused to consider the size of a holding in valuing stock.
In Gamble v. Commissioner, 101 F.2d 565 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 306 U.S. 664 (1939), the
Sixth Circuit upheld a Board of Tax Appeals finding that the value of a large holding of
Procter & Gamble stock equaled that calculated by the general rule of the statute. Id. at 568.
The court noted that the board rightfully had chosen to ignore the opinions of the executor's
experts. Id. at 567. The decision hinged upon the speculative nature of the estimated reduced
value of the stock in the absence of specific examples. The court relied upon the concrete
method of valuation promulgated by the Commissioner. Id. In a holding similar to that of
the Gamble court, the Board of Tax Appeals in Estate of Chisholm v. Commissioner, 37
B.T.A. 167 (1938), rejected as "conjectural" a stockbroker's opinion that decedent's large
holding of mining stock would be worth almost thirty percent less because of blockage factors.
Id. at 170. The board particularly noted the lack of evidence as to the financial condition and
prospectus for the corporation. Id. at 171.
Despite the blistering attack of the Bingham court upon the blockage theory and its
rejection in later decisions, the courts grudgingly began to grant approval to its use as a factor
in determining fair market value. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Stewart's Estate, 153 F.2d 17
(3d Cir. 1946); Phipps v. Commissioner, 127 F.2d 214 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 645
(1942). In its decision in Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 35 B.T.A. 259 (1937),
the Board of Tax Appeals reduced the Commissioner's formulaic appraisal of a large block
of railroad stock from $44 per share to $35 per share. Id. at 261-63. The board, however, relied
heavily on the declining value of the stock just prior to the decedent's death during the
Depression. It specifically noted that its finding of value was not "any dogmatic recognition
or nonrecognition of any so-called 'blockage' rule," calling it merely "a matter of evidence."
Id. at 263.
During the late 1930's the courts overtly began to recognize the correctness of the princi-
ples of the blockage theory. The opinion in Jenkins v. Smith, 21 F. Supp. 251 (D. Conn. 1937),
represents the early rationale of the courts in accepting the theory. The Jenkins court refused
to acknowledge per se that each share in a large block of stock is worth less than each in a
small lot. Id. at 253. It did admit, however, that the value of the whole is not necessarily the
sum of the values of its parts. Quoting from a treatise, the court stated that the
"'determination of market value requires a consideration of the salability of the entire block
held.' " Id. at 254 (quoting 5 R. PAuL & J. MERTENs, LAw oF FEDERAL INcoME TAXATION §
52.17A (1934 & Supp.)). The court then proceeded to reduce the Commissioner's formulaic
valuation by approximately five percent. Id. at 254. Following the reasoning of the Jenkins
court, the Board of Tax Appeals allowed a reduction from the Commissioner's determination
of value in Girard Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 6 B.T.A.M. (P-H) 15 (1937). The board ruled
that the " 'fair market value' to be arrived at then is the fair market value of the decedent's
total holdings in Curtis Publishing Co. stock-not the fair market value of a part thereof."
Id. at 18.
Ultimately the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit ensured the legiti-
macy of the blockage theory by endorsing it in Helvering v. Maytag, 125 F.2d 55 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 316 U.S. 689 (1942). The court stated: "As well as any controverted question of
administrative law may be settled without declaration by the Supreme Court, it is established
that the size of a block of listed stock may be a factor to be considered in its valuation for
gift or estate tax purposes." Id. at 63.
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voluminous sale would lower the price of the stock, the executor
should consider the effect of such a sale in valuing the stock in the
decedent's estate.2 1 The fair market value rule of a willing buyer and
a willing seller with knowledge of relevant facts supports this claim.
A willing buyer who knows that the seller has a large block of stock
to sell also realizes that in order to dispose of the block the seller
may accept a price somewhat lower than the market price. This will
affect the price that the buyer offers.
The blockage principle is not necessarily based on a hypotheti-
cal sale on the date of the decedent's death. Such an assumed sale
could lead to a valuation based on a forced sales price, which would
violate the requirement of noncompulsion on the part of the buyer
or seller. Instead, blockage refers to the difference between the sum
of the unit values of the stock if it is sold in quantities easily ab-
sorbed by the market and the value of the block in question. Rele-
vant factors include distribution methods, market capacity, market
development costs, selling-period length, and prolonged-sales
risks."
Executors have attempted to extend the blockage theory to
include a reduction in value for the expense of secondary distribu-
tions, arguing that in certain situations the most favorable method
of disposing of stock is through an underwriter rather than on an
open exchange.? Thus they argue that the fair market value of a
block of stock should equal the net proceeds received by the estate
after payment of the costs of underwriting.
Initially, the courts did not look favorably upon this extension
of the blockage theory.2 4 In Clause v. Commissioners the Tax Court
refused to allow any reduction from the stock exchange price for the
cost of a secondary distribution. Although emphasizing the value of
the stock to taxpayer if the stock were retained, the court pointed
out that the ultimate purchasers would pay the quoted price.', This
emphasis on retention value, however, runs counter to the definition
of fair market value based on a sale between a willing buyer and a
willing seller.Y In contrast to Clause, the Tax Court permitted a
reduction from market quotations on the valuation of a large block
21. [1977] 2 FED. EsT. & Girr TAx REP. (CCH) 6380.75.
22. 10 J. MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INcoME TAxATION § 59.15 (rev. ed. 1976).
23. Id.
24. E.g., Groff v. Munford, 150 F.2d 825 (2d Cir. 1945), aff'g Groff v. Smith, 43-2 U.S.
Tax Cas. 10,067 (D. Conn. 1943). Contra Richardson v. Commissioner, 151 F.2d 102 (2d
Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 796 (1946).
25. 5 T.C. 647 (1945), aff'd, 154 F.2d 655 (3d Cir. 1946).
26. Id. at 650.
27. Trees. Reg. § 20.2031-1(b), T.D. 6826, 1965-2 C.B. 368.
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of stock in Avery v. Commissioner."s Despite the lack of an actual
disposition through a secondary distribution, the court allowed the
reduction based upon a hypothetical transaction. 29 Similarly, in
Havemeyer v. United States,0 the Court of Claims established the
value of large holdings of stock to be that amount that could be
realized from an underwriter.31 In addition, other courts have char-
acterized secondary distribution expenses as blockage elements,
and thus have clearly established these expenses as a stock valua-
tion factor.3 2
Initially, the Internal Revenue Service (Service) strenuously
resisted application of the blockage theory." Regulations to the In-
ternal Revenue Codes of 1926 and 1932 expressly prohibited any
consideration of the size of a stock holding during valuation.34 As the
courts began to favor the blockage theory, however, the Service
began to retreat from its position. First, the regulations to the Inter-
nal Revenue Code of 1939 did not refer to whether size of holdings
is a relevant factor in stock valuation.-' Later regulations to the
Internal Revenue Code of 1954 acknowledged blockage as a factor
of valuation." Finally, in a subsequent revenue ruling, the Service
emphasized the importance of size in determining the value of hold-
28. 3 T.C. 963 (1944).
29. Id. at 970-71.
30. 59 F. Supp. 537 (Ct. Cl.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 759 (1945).
31. Id. at 549.
32. See, e.g., St. Joseph Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 48 A.F.T.R. (P-H) 1561
(N.D. Ind. 1953); Estate of Garrett v. Commissioner, 22 T.C.M. (P-H) 1026, 1034 (1953);
Fleming v. Commissioner, 20 T.C.M. (P-H) 660, 663-65 (1951).
33. The Maytag court acknowledged the persistence of the Commissioner in opposing
the blockage theory in sixteen other cases. 125 F.2d at 63.
34. 26 C.F.R. § 80.10(c) (1938) (superseded) provided in part:
In exceptional cases in which it is established by clear and convincing evidence that
the value per bond or share of any security determined upon the basis of selling or bid
and asked prices as herein provided does not reflect the fair market value thereof, other
relevant facts and elements of value will be considered in determining the fair market
value. The size of holdings of any security to be included in the gross estate is not a
relevant factor and will not be considered in such determination. [Emphasis added.]
35. 26 C.F.R. § 81.10(c) (1942) (superseded).
36. Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-2(e) (1958) provides in part:
In certain exceptional cases, the size of the block of stock to be valued in relation to the
number of shares changing hands in sales may be relevant in determining whether selling
prices reflect the fair market value of the block of stock to be valued. If the executor
can show that the block of stock to be valued is so large in relation to the actual sales
on the existing market that it could not be liquidated in a reasonable time without
depressing the market, the price at which the block could be sold as such outside the
usual market, as through an underwriter, may be a more accurate indication of value
than market quotations . . . . On the other hand, if the block of stock to be valued
represents a controlling interest, either actual or effective, in a going business, the price
at which other lots change hands may have little relation to its true value.
1008
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ings of stock." Thus blockage theory is now clearly considered a
relevant factor in stock valuation under section 2031.
III. SECTION 2053: THE DEDUCTION OF THE UNDERWRITER'S DIscOUNT
In arriving at the taxable estate upon which the estate tax is
imposed, the executor may deduct several items from the gross es-
tate under section 2053 of the Code,"8 including administrative ex-
penses allowable under local law.39 The Service has attempted to
police abuse of these deductions by imposing additional require-
ments on these deductions." Specifically, the Service allows a de-
37. Rev. Rul. 59-60, 1959-1 C.B. 237, § 4.01(g).
38. See note 6 supra.
39. I.R.C. § 2053(a) provides:
(a) General Rule.-For purposes of the tax imposed by section 2001, the value of
the taxable estate shall be determined by deducting from the value of the gross estate
such amounts-
(1) for funeral expenses,
(2) for administration expenses,
(3) for claims against the estate, and
(4) for unpaid mortgages on, or any indebtedness in respect of, property where
the value of the decedent's interest therein, undiminished by such mortgage or
indebtedness, is included in the value of the gross estate,
as are allowable by the laws of the jurisdiction, whether within or without the United
States, under which the estate is being administered.
40. Tress. Reg. § 20.2053-3(a)(1958) provides:
(a) In general. The amounts deductible from a decedent's gross estate as
"administration expenses" of the first category (see paragraphs (a) and (c) of § 20.2053-
1) are limited to such expenses as are actually and necessarily incurred in the adminis-
tration of the decedent's estate; that is in the collection of assets, payment of debts, and
distribution of property to the persons entitled to it. The expenses contemplated in the
law are such only as attend the settlement of an estate and the transfer of the property
of the estate to individual beneficiaries or to a trustee, whether the trustee is the executor
or some other person. Expenditures not essential to the proper settlement of the estate,
but incurred for the individual benefit of the heirs, legatees, or devisees, may not be
taken as deductions. Administration expenses include (1) executor's commissions; (2)
attorney's fees; and (3) miscellaneous expenses. Each of these classes is considered
separately in paragraphs (b) through (d) of this section.
Treas. Reg. § 20.2053-3(d)(2) (1965) provides:
Expenses for selling property of the estate are deductible if the sale is necessary in
order to pay the decedent's debts, expenses of administration, or taxes, to preserve the
estate, or to effect distribution. The phrase "expenses for selling property" includes
brokerage fees and other expenses attending the sale, such as the fees of an auctioneer
if it is reasonably necessary to employ one. Where an item included in the gross estate
is disposed of in a bona fide sale (including a redemption) to a dealer in such items at a
price below its fair market value, for purposes of this paragraph there shall be treated
as an expense for selling the item whichever of the following amounts is the lesser: (i)
the amount by which the fair market value of the property on the applicable valuation
date exceeds the proceeds of the sale, or (ii) the amount by which the fair market value
of the property on the date of the sale exceeds the proceeds of the sale. The principles
used in determining the value at which an item of property is included in the gross estate
shall be followed in arriving at the fair market value of the property for purposes of this
paragraph.
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duction for selling expenses only if the sale of assets is necessary to
meet the obligations of the estate, including debts, taxes, expenses,
and distribution requirements.
A split of authority has developed in the courts over the validity
of this necessity requirement." In Estate of Park v. Commissioner42
the Sixth Circuit rejected the Service's argument that a selling ex-
pense must be necessary in order to be deductible." The decedent
died owning a residence and a cottage, both of which passed to the
decedent's four sons under the residuary clause of her will. Because
they were not interested in retaining the properties, the sons re-
quested the administrator" to sell the property." The Michigan
probate court allowed the selling costs as miscellaneous administra-
tive expenses," and the administrator deducted them as such. The
Commissioner disallowed the deduction, 7 and the Tax Court af-
firmed."
The Commissioner based his argument on the failure of the
taxpayer to meet the necessity requirement stated in the regula-
tions. Taxpayer argued that the regulations "impose[d] an invalid
and impermissible restriction on the availability of a deduction pro-
vided in the Internal Revenue Code."" Resting its decision upon the
literal language of the Code and ignoring the regulations, the court
reasoned that Congress had committed to the states the decision
whether a particular item was an allowable expense. Thus the court
concluded that, because the Michigan probate court allowed the
expenses as a deduction, the expenses were deductible from the
gross estate for federal estate tax purposes.50
In contrast to the decision of the Sixth Circuit, the Second
Circuit in Estate of Smith v. Commissioner" upheld a Tax Court
ruling imposing the necessity requirement. In Estate of Smith, the
decedent artist died while still possessing several of his own sculp-
41. For detailed discussions of the necessity requirement and its ramifications, see
Note, Current Problems Facing the Executor Taking the Section 2053 Estate Tax Deduction,
30 VAND. L. REv. 795, 796-811 (1977); Note, Deductibility of Estate Selling Expenses, 51 S.
CAL. L. REv. 101 (1977).
42. 475 F.2d 673 (6th Cir. 1973).
43. Id. at 676.
44. The decedent's personal representative was an administrator with will annexed.
45. 475 F.2d at 674.
46. There was no question that the items were allowable under Michigan law. Id. at
674 n.2.
47. Id. at 674.
48. 57 T.C. 705 (1972).
49. 475 F.2d at 675.
50. Id. at 676.
51. 510 F.2d 479 (2d Cir. 1975).
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tures. In order to obtain the most beneficial return from the sale of
the sculptures, the executors proceeded with an orderly eight-year
plan of disposal.52 Due to the size of the collection and the care
necessary for disposal, the estate incurred brokerage fees in excess
of $1,500,000. Upon presentation of the executors' report, the New
York Surrogate's Court allowed the entire amount as a deduction.53
The Tax Court, however, allowed only the amount necessarily in-
curred to obtain the funds to meet estate obligations.5 '
The executors argued that the full amount of selling costs was
necessary to preserve the estate and meet obligations and that the
decision of the Surrogate's Court was determinative of the issue of
necessity." The Second Circuit found that the judgment of the Tax
Court as to the amount necessary was not clearly erroneous." Re-
garding the finality of the state court's determination of necessity,
the court of appeals noted that the interest of the federal govern-
ment in taxing estates would not always coincide with the interest
of state governments in supervising executors and administrators.
The court reasoned that the interest of the federal government
might not be sufficiently protected by the state. Thus, in the Second
Circuit's view, the federal judiciary must be able to reexamine the
facts to determine necessity."
IV. INTERACTION OF SECTIONS 2031 AND 2053
A. Introduction
The statutory provisions and judicial interpretation outlined
above indicate that an estate that holds large blocks of securities
that are difficult to dispose of will enjoy a significant tax benefit.
First, in valuing the stock the executor will be able to reduce the
value to account for selling costs and other blockage elements.58 In
the usual situation, the executor will file the estate tax return nine
months after the date of the decedent's death,"5 at which time he
52. Id. at 480.
53. Id. at 480-81.
54. 57 T.C. 650, 661-62 (1972).
55. 510 F.2d at 481-82.
56. Id. at 482.
57. Id. at 482-83. In a strong dissent, the minority chastised the court for its failure to
follow the plain meaning of the statute. It followed the argument in Estate of Park that
because Congress placed the question in the hands of the state, state law controlled without
limitation. The dissenting judge found the "clearly erroneous" test inappropriate, and
thought that the Tax Court should have no role in determining necessity. Id. at 483-85
(Mulligan, J., dissenting).
58. See note 20 supra.
59. I.R.C. § 6075(a).
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probably will not have disposed of the stock. After calculating the
fair market value according to the section 2031 formula," the execu-
tor will consult an expert appraiser who will give his opinion as to
the percentage discount that would properly reflect the expenses
necessary to sell the securities through an underwriter. The executor
then determines the value of the stock to the estate by reducing the
fair market value calculated earlier by this percentage discount.
The sum of this figure and the values of all other property held by
the estate will equal the value of the gross estate.
To arrive at the taxable estate, the executor will then reduce
the gross estate by any applicable deductions," including the selling
costs incurred in disposing of the stock. 2 This figure may equal the
full amount allowable under state law or only that amount necessar-
ily spent to obtain funds to meet estate obligations." Whatever the
figure, the executor will derive the taxable estate by reducing the
calculated fair market value of the securities twice for the same
expense.
B. Statutory Provisions
Despite the obvious boon to the taxpayer, the Internal Revenue
Code places no limitations upon this double benefit for selling ex-
penses. In contrast, section 642 forbids the double deduction of
amounts allowable under both sections 2053 and 20544 from the
taxable income of the estate. 5 The Tax Reform Act of 1976 extends
the disallowance of double deductions by prohibiting executors from
both deducting selling expenses from the gross estate of the dece-
dent for estate tax purposes and offsetting those expenses against
60. See notes 15-19 supra and accompanying text.
61. See notes 38-39 supra and accompanying text.
62. The exact figure is unknown at the time the return is filed; it may be entered in
the return upon an audit by the Internal Revenue Service after the disposition has been
completed. If not, any adjustments to the deduction can be reported in the income tax return
of the estate. I.R.C. § 642(g).
63. See notes 38-57 supra and accompanying text.
64. Section 2053 allows deductions from the gross estate for expenses, indebtedness, and
taxes while § 2054 permits deductions for losses.
65. I.R.C. § 642(g) provides:
(g) Disallowance of Double Deductions.-Amounts allowable under section 2053
or 2054 as a deduction in computing the taxable estate of a decedent shall not be allowed
as a deduction (or as an offset against the sales price of property in determining gain or
loss) in computing the taxable income of the estate or of any other person, unless there
is filed, within the time and in the manner and form prescribed by the Secretary, a
statement that the amounts have not been allowed as deductions under section 2053 or
2054 and a waiver of the right to have such amounts allowed at any time as deductions
under section 2053 or 2054. This subsection shall not apply with respect to deductions
allowed under part II (relating to income in respect of decedents).
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the selling price of property in determining gain or loss for income
tax purposes." The restrictions of section 642 apply only in those
cases in which a single item could reduce both estate and income
tax liabilities. No provision, however, limits the use of one item both
to reduce gross estate value and as a deduction for estate tax pur-
poses.
C. Judicial Interpretation
Prior to the two recent court of appeals cases discussed in this
Recent Development,"7 no case specifically considered the double
deduction issue. The Third Circuit, however, hinted at how courts
might receive the double deduction question in Haggart's Estate v.
Commissioner. * In Haggart's Estate, the court reversed a Tax Court
decision"' disallowing deduction of certain trust expenses when the
decedent's estate included the corpus of the trust.o The court al-
lowed the deduction but refused to characterize it as an administra-
tive expense or a reduction in gross estate value, reasoning that the
result would be the same. The decision implies, however, that an
item is either a deductible expense or a reduction in value, but not
both.
V. RECENT DECISIONS
A. Estate of Joslyn v. Commissioner
(1) Joslyn I
The first case expressly to consider the deductibility of under-
writers' commissions after they have reduced the value of a block
of stock was Estate of Joslyn v. Commissioner.72 At the time of his
death the decedent in Joslyn owned a large block of stock in a
manufacturing corporation." The estate incurred substantial ex-
traordinary expenses in the probate of the will. To meet the obliga-
tions of the estate, the executor elected to liquidate a portion of the
66. Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 2009(d), 90 Stat. 1896 (1976). In addition to the executor, any
other person is prohibited from offsetting these selling expenses against the selling price in
determining gain or loss for income tax purposes. I.R.C. § 642(g).
67. See text accompanying notes 72-118 infra.
68. 182 F.2d 514 (3d Cir. 1950).
69. 13 T.C. 14 (1949).
70. 182 F.2d at 515-16.
71. Id. at 516. The court stated, "Whether they are to be allowed as expenses of admin-
istration or whether they are to be allowed in diminution of the gross estate does not matter
in this case. It comes out the same either way . . . ." Id.
72. 57 T.C. 722 (1972), rev'd, 500 F.2d 382 (9th Cir. 1974), on remand, 63 T.C. 478
(1975), rev'd, 566 F.2d 677 (9th Cir. 1977).
73. 57 T.C. at 723. The decedent owned 66,099 shares of Joslyn Mfg. & Supply Co. Id.
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stock through a secondary offering." Following an audit, the Service
and the executor agreed upon the value of the stock. This value
reflected a reduction for blockage elements of the full amount of
selling expenses, including underwriters' fees. 5 After agreeing to
this valuation, the executor claimed as administrative expenses a
deduction for the full amount of the selling costs relating to the
secondary offering. The Commissioner disallowed over ninety-eight
percent of the deduction.76
The Tax Court agreed with the Commissioner that selling ex-
penses could not be both offset against the value of the property and
deducted as an administrative expense. The court based its deci-
sion mainly upon the equitable principle that no item could be used
twice to reduce the taxable estate of a decedent. Without any defini-
tive authority, the court stated that such a benefit "surely was not
contemplated under section 2053(a)."n The decision did refer to
Haggart's Estate and the Tax Court's later opinion in Abbett v.
Commissioner," in which the courts permitted certain items either
to reduce the gross estate or to be deducted as an expense."o In
addition, the court distinguished Estate of Bray v. Commissioner,"
in which the court allowed the deduction of selling expenses for
estate tax purposes and their use as an offset against the selling
price for determination of gain or loss. 2 In the court's opinion, the
74. Id.
75. The IRS and the executor agreed to establish the value as follows:
Fair market value at date of death determined by
taking the mean between the high and the low .... $3,470,197.50
Less: Travel expense ..................... $489.52
Bond.premium for underwriter ............. 13,679.09
Attorneys for underwriter ................. 6,860.35
Reimbursement to Joslyn Mfg............. 46,366.66
Additional cost for Joslyn Mfg............ 1,081.30
Costs of Kindel & Anderson ............... 1,327.70
Additional costs Kindel & Anderson ........ . 399.07
Fees for registration ..................... 7,546.38
Underwriters fees ...................... 288,750.00
Total blockage elements ......................... 366,500.07
Value included in gross estate ..................... 3,103,697.43
Id. at 724.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 727.
78. Id. at 725.
79. 17 T.C. 1293 (1952) (cited in 57 T.C. at 725).
80. See text accompanying notes 68-71 supra.
81. 46 T.C. 577 (1966) (distinguished in 57 T.C. at 726).
82. Prior to October 4, 1976, selling expenses could be deducted for estate tax purposes
and used as an offset to gross value in determining gain or loss for income tax purposes. The
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reduction in value coupled with a deduction was permissible in the
interaction of two separate schemes of taxation, but not within the
parameters of the single estate tax."
On appeal the Ninth Circuit reversed the decision of the Tax
Court." The court noted that expenses of administration allowed by
the state probate court were generally deductible in calculating the
estate, but that the Tax Court had failed to consider the deductibil-
ity under section 2053 of the Code." The court did not recognize
Haggart's Estate as precedent because that case did not raise the
blockage issue." Finally, the court found that no double deduction
existed. According to the court, prior decisions disallowing double
deductions in the calculation of income tax had considered the ac-
tual deduction of the same item twice. This case, however, pre-
sented a reduction in gross estate value and a deduction for expen-
ses. The court concluded that this was not the " 'practical equiva-
lent of double deduction.' "" The court of appeals thus remanded
the case to the Tax Court for a determination of deductibility under
secton 2053.8
(2) Joslyn II
On remand the Tax Court characterized the selling costs, not
as administrative expenses, but as profit to the underwriters." The
court reasoned that because the form of agreement between the
estate and the underwriters was a "firm commitment" underwrit-
ing,"o it was essentially a sale to the underwriters who then resold
the stock to the public." The executor argued that the estate still
bore significant risk because certain conditions could prevent the
sale. If the sale was not consummated, the executor argued, the
stock would remain in the estate rather than in the hands of the
underwriters." Rejecting the executor's arguments, the Tax Court
reasoned that the underwriters were more than agents of the estate
Tax Reform Act of 1976 eliminated this double deduction. See note 66 supra and accompany-
ing text.
83. 57 T.C. at 725-26.
84. 500 F.2d 382, 387 (9th Cir. 1974).
85. Id. at 385.
86. Id. at 385-86.
87. Id. at 386 (quoting Charles Ilfield Co. v. Hernandez, 292 U.S. 62, 68 (1934)).
88. Id. at 387.
89. 63 T.C. 478, 485 (1975).
90. A "firm commitment" underwriting is one in which the seller is assured of a sum
certain at a specified time. Many of the risks are transferred to the underwriter, although
some risk remains with the seller. 1 Loss, SEcuarriEs REGULATiON 164 (2d ed. 1961).
91. 63 T.C. at 483-84.
92. Id. at 484.
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because they lacked the power to terminate the contract at will.
Thus the firm commitment offering constituted a sale rather than
a "mere formalism."93
Persisting in his belief that the expenses were deductible, the
executor again appealed to the Ninth Circuit." The court of appeals
analyzed the case as if the amount of blockage had been estimated
instead of known precisely. The court reasoned that if the executor
had valued the asset at a different figure because he had estimated
the blockage element without the benefit of hindsight, the reduction
in value would not have equaled the administrative expense deduc-
tion. Thus the appearance of duplication would have vanished and
the deduction would have been allowed. Accordingly, the court con-
cluded that whether or not the figures were duplicative, the validity
of the deduction remained the same." The court viewed the transac-
tion simply as a service for which the estate paid, and which the
probate court allowed as an expense." Citing cases allowing broker-
age and underwriting fees as deductions," the court equated the
underwriting fee in this case to the charge made by a real estate
broker for selling a home."
B. Estate of Jenner v. Commissioner
Estate of Jenner v. Commissioner" presented the same issue as
Joslyn, but in a slightly different factual setting.1'" The decedent
owned a large block of stock in a nonleveraged, nondiversified,
closed-end investment company.101 The decedent's corporate execu-
tor'02 decided to sell some of this stock in order to meet estate obliga-
93. Id. at 484-85.
94. 566 F.2d 677 (9th Cir. 1977).
95. Id. at 678.
96. Id.
97. Id. (citing Estate of Park v. Commissioner, 475 F.2d 673 (6th Cir. 1973); Estate of
Huntington v. Commissioner, 36 B.T.A. 698, 726 (1937)).
98. 566 F.2d at 679.
99. 36 T.C.M. (CCH) 241 (1977), rev'd, 577 F.2d 1100 (7th Cir. 1978).
100. In addition, the court set the value of large blocks of stock in two corporations held
by the decedent at the time of her death. Subsequent to the decedent's death, the two
corporations merged leaving only the stock of one corporation to be liquidated to obtain the
funds to meet estate obligations. 36 T.C.M. (CCH) at 241, 243-44.
101. An investment company is non-leveraged if it has no debt in its capitaliza-
tion; non-diversified if it has more than five percent of the value of its total assets
invested in one issue; and closed-end if it has no redeemable security outstanding and
does not constantly offer new shares for sale. Investment Company Act of 1940, ch. 686,
tit. I, sec. 5, 54 Stat. 800, 15 U.S.C. sec. 80a-5.
Id. at 241 n.2. On the date of death the decedent held 226,800 shares of Baker Fentress &
Co. or approximately 13.9% of that company's outstanding stock. Id. at 241. Following the
merger the estate held 319,347 shares of the corporation. Id. at 243.
102. The executor was Continental Illinois National Bank and Trust Company of Chi-
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tions.1os He proposed a secondary offering and filed a preliminary
registration with the Securities and Exchange Commission.," The
executor entered into a firm commitment underwriting agreement
that provided for a selling price of $38.85 per share. The estate was
to bear all expenses, but, following the usual practice, the contract
did not require the payment of an underwriting discount or commis-
sion. It was apparent, however, that the underwriters would sell the
securities to the public for $42 per share, retaining the difference of
$3.15 as their commission.10 The agreement also provided that the
underwriters could unilaterally terminate the contract if the SEC
withheld approval, legal counsel objected to the offering, accoun-
tants disagreed on valuation, or a majority of the underwriters be-
lieved a material adverse change in the value of the corporation
occurred between the prospectus date and the sale date.10 Upon
completion of the transaction, the underwriters presented a check
to the executor in an amount equivalent to $42 per share. In return
the estate paid the underwriters $3.15 per share, netting $38.85 per
share as the proceeds of the sale. 07
In setting the value of the stock held by the estate, the Tax
Court heard the testimony of several expert witnesses and consid-
ered blockage elements. 0o The executor argued that the underwrit-
ing discount should be deducted along with the other expenses of
the sale despite the consideration of blockage elements in establish-
ing value.' Relying solely on its prior decision in Joslyn , 110 the
cago. Id. at 243.
103. The estate needed to raise between $5.8 and $8.8 million to satisfy debts, taxes,
and administrative expenses. Id.
104. Hereinafter referred to as SEC.
105. 36 T.C.M. (CCH) at 244.
106. Id. Such provisions are styled "market-out" clauses and are common in firm com-
mitment underwritings. See Estate of Joslyn v. Commissione-, 63 T.C. 478, 484 (1975).
107. 36 T.C.M. (CCH) at 244-45.
108. Id. at 246-49.
109. The executor claimed the following items as administrative expenses:
Registration fee ............... .................. $ 2,722.00
Knouff & Ley legal fee and expenses ............ .... ... 25,002.25
Consolidated-Tomoka Land Co. reimbursement for
expenses .. ............................... 610.00
Consolidated-Tomoka Land Co. reimbursement for
expenses .................................. .... 256.93
Rex Meighen & Co. accounting services ................ 7,500.00
Touche Ross & Co. accounting services .................. 24,000.00
Blyth & Co., Inc., reimbursement Blue Sky Laws expense . 5,025.00
Sorg Printing Company printing expense ......... ..... 6,205.16
Fred James & Co. premium for Securities Act Liability
Insurance .... ............................. 66,780.00
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Tax Court affirmed the Commissioner's disallowance of the deduc-
tion."n The court placed great emphasis upon the fact that no con-
tractual obligation to pay an underwriting discount existed. Echo-
ing its decision in Joslyn II, the court classified the underwriting
agreement as a contract to sell the securities. The risks borne by the
estate did not outweigh the inability of the underwriters to termi-
nate the contract at will. The court viewed the exchange of checks
as "mere paper transactions,""' the result of which was a sale of
stock for $38.85 per share. Moreover, that court concluded that any
amounts beyond that were underwriters' profits and not administra-
tive expenses." 3
On appeal the Seventh Circuit reversed and allowed the deduc-
tion of underwriters' expenses." Analyzing the nature of the firm
commitment underwriting, the court concluded that the underwri-
ters carried very little risk. It found incongruous the Tax Court's
decision to allow the deduction for a best efforts underwriting but
not for a firm commitment. In the Seventh Circuit's view, this di-
chotomy arbitrarily penalized those stockholders whose stock was
valuable enough to obtain a firm commitment underwriting."' Fur-
thermore, the court found the characterization of the agreement as
a contract for the sale of stock to be inconsistent with an underwri-
ter's duties under SEC regulations prohibiting the purchase of stock
by underwriters for their own account."' Thus the court concluded
that the underwriting discount was an administrative expense.
After making this determination, the court proceeded to con-
sider the deductibility of the underwriting discount. The court cited
Estate of Park"' for the proposition that state law alone should
Bell, Boyd, Lloyd, Haddad & Burns legal fee and expenses 39,769.10
Sorg Printing Company printing expense ............... 48,240.03
James Fentress reimbursement of expenses ............ 740.56
Glenn Ingram & Co. accounting services ............... 995.00
Sullivan & Cromwell legal fee and expenses ............. 7,054.89
O'Melveny & Meyer legal fee and expenses ............. 1,269.40
Underwriting discount ............................... 945,000.00
Total ......................................... $1,181,170.32
Id. at 245.
110. The Ninth Circuit had not yet decided Joslyn II.
111. 36 T.C.M. (CCH) at 249.
112. Id. at 250.
113. Id.
114. 577 F.2d 1100, 1107 (7th Cir. 1978).
115. Id. at 1105.
116. Id.; see 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-6 (1978).
117. 577 F.2d at 1106 (citing 475 F.2d 673 (6th Cir. 1973)).
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determine the deductibility of administrative expenses. The Com-
missioner argued that the court should remand the case to the Tax
Court for a finding of necessity. The executor contended, on the
other hand, that the Tax Court had already made that determina-
tion. Although not agreeing with the executor completely, the court
determined that the record presented facts sufficient to uphold the
state court's finding of necessity,"8 and therefore allowed the deduc-
tion of the underwriters' commissions.
VI. COMMENT
The decisions of the courts of appeals in Joslyn and Jenner
correctly apply the law of estate taxation to estates possessing large
blocks of securities. The decisions cannot be criticized for their re-
sults. The Internal Revenue Code as drafted permits the simultane-
ous reduction of gross estate value for blockage elements and deduc-
tion of the selling costs that make up those elements as administra-
tive expenses. The Ninth Circuit in Joslyn I, however, does stretch
the bounds of reason in declaring that the executor's position does
not result in the "practical equivalent of a double deduction.""'
Undeniably, a double deduction does exist. The executor uses the
same item twice to reduce the estate's liability for a single tax. In
any event, whether a double deduction exists or not is irrelevant.
Taxation is not a cohesive body of law. Courts often give little or
no consideration to what is logical if it differs from the language of
the Code. The court in Joslyn I implicitly recognized this. After
denying the existence of a double deduction, that court found that
allowing the Commissioner to select a method of determining value
would deprive the estate of a statutory deduction."' Thus the real
issue for these courts was not whether a double deduction is proper,
but rather whether the Code permits the deduction even though the
same item is used to reduce the gross estate. Because the Code does
not prohibit this double deduction, the courts of appeals correctly
allowed it to be taken.
In denying the deductions in the first place, the Tax Court in
these cases attempted to fashion the law without authority. Without
specific precedent, the court assumed the role of a chancellor striv-
ing to do equity. Recognizing the presence of the double deduction
in the Code, the court set out to correct Congress' oversight. As the
Ninth Circuit noted, however, that is not the proper role of the
118. 577 F.2d at 1106-07.
119. 500 F.2d at 386; see text accompanying note 87 supra.
120. 500 F.2d at 386.
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court; it borders on judicial legislation.12' The courts must adhere
to congressional statutory directives and cannot go beyond them to
achieve a higher equitable goal. If the effect of the statutory scheme
is inequitable, then Congress must change the scheme.
The Tax Court in Joslyn I noted that allowing the same expen-
ses twice in computing the amount of the estate subject to tax surely
could not have been contemplated by Congress. 22 Section 2053, the
section allowing the underwriting discount as a deduction, also pro-
vides evidence that Congress would not have allowed such a double
deduction if it had been aware of its existence. This section elimi-
nates any double deduction for indebtedness in property. Section
2053 permits the deduction of unpaid mortgages or any indebted-
ness on property only if the executor has not reduced the property's
value in the gross estate by the amount of such mortgage or indebt-
edness.123 If Congress had allowed a mortgage deduction without
including the limiting language concerning gross estate value, the
estate would benefit from a double deduction similar to that in the
case of underwriting discounts.124
The deduction of underwriters' commissions under section 2053
results in disregard for the true value of the securities to the estate.
These commissions must either reduce the gross estate value under
section 2031 or be deducted as expenses under section 2053, but not
both. In order to remedy this situation, this Recent Development
proposes that Congress amend section 2053(a)(2) of the Code to
read:
(2) for administration expenses, when the value of the gross estate is undi-
minished by such administration expenses or estimates thereof, . . 1
VII. CONCLUSION
Existing estate tax law provides an effective double deduction
to estates possessing large blocks of securities that are difficult to
121. Id.
122. 57 T.C. at 725.
123. See note 39 supra.
124. Consider the calculation of the gross estate with the limiting language of § 2053
omitted: The decedent dies owning a home worth $100,000 with an unpaid mortgage of
$20,000. The executor values the home at $80,000 in the estate tax return since that is the
amount to be realized by the estate. Then the executor deducts the $20,000 mortgage under
this fictional § 2053. The taxable value of the home is then $60,000. Such a result is ridiculous;
the estate receives $40,000 of benefit from a $20,000 mortgage. Any fair person cringes at such
a result. Another estate that holds a home worth $80,000 debt-free is taxed on the full value.
Such a statutory scheme would ignore the equity that the owner has in the home.
125. This language is similar to the language prohibiting the double deduction of un-
paid mortgages or indebtedness. I.R.C. § 2053(a) (4); see notes 39 & 123 supra and accom-
panying text.
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liquidate. The executor can reduce the gross estate by an amount
estimated to reflect properly the net proceeds that the estate will
receive from the sale. The costs of disposition can be deducted again
as administrative expenses if state law allows. Courts may require,
however, that the sale be necessary to meet estate obligations.
When compared with the treatment of similar items, the treat-
ment of underwriting expenses is clearly a loophole in estate tax law.
As a general principle, no item should be used twice to reduce the
gross estate. Although taxation is not necessarily based on equitable
principles, without specific reason, no estate should receive inad-
vertent benefits because of its particular assets. Congress should
therefore rectify this problem by amending section 2053 to prohibit
the deduction of administrative expenses previously allowed as an
offset to the gross estate.
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